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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
NATIONAL ESTIMATES BOARD

10 August 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, OIR
Colonel B. D. Talley, G-2
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFONI
Captain R. G. McCool, JIG

SUBJECT : NIE-41: Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute to the End of 1951

1. The enclosed terms of reference were agreed on by the IAC representatives meeting on 10 August 1951.

2. It is requested that contributions be received in this office by the close of business on Monday, 20 August from State, Navy, and Air Force. The Army contribution is requested by Thursday, 23 August.

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Executive Secretary

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
O F F I C E O F N A T I O N A L E S T I M A T E S

10 August 1951

S U B J E C T : T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E : NIE-41: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS
I N T H E KASHMIR DISPUTE TO THE END OF 1951

(Revised text for IAC Representatives)

T H E P R O B L E M

To estimate Indian and Pakistani capabilities and intentions concerning Kashmir, and to indicate probable developments in the dispute during 1951, with particular reference to the possible use of armed force.

Q U E S T I O N S B E A R I N G O N T H E P R O B L E M

I. W H A T I S T H E C U R R E N T S T A T U S O F K A S H M I R ?

Brief introductory section outlining the development of the dispute up through the designation of the Graham mission and the present upsurge of tension. It should note: (1) the military situation in Kashmir, including deployment of the respective forces; and (2) the position of the Abdullah and Azad Kashmir governments; and (3) the role of the UN and recent UN activity. Significant dates should be specified.

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II. WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN KASHMIR?

A. What are the roots of Indian interest in Kashmir?

- OIR 1. Nationalism (including religious, historical, and prestige factors) -- how important and enduring is this interest?
- OIR 2. Economic: is Kashmir important to the Indian economy? How and to what degree? Could possession of Kashmir be used to bring economic pressure on Pakistan particularly through control of the water supply?
- G-2 3. Military: what is the importance of Kashmir in relation to possible conflict with Pakistan? -- in relation to conflict with any other nation? Do military leaders of India attach importance to Kashmir?
- OIR 4. What is the relation of the Kashmir issue to Indian domestic politics?
- OIR and G-2 5. What is the relative weight of these factors? Is there any particular urgency or a time factor attached to any one or to all?

B. What are the roots of Pakistani interest in Kashmir?

- OIR 1. Nationalism (including religious, historical, and prestige factors) -- how important and enduring is this interest?

2. Economic: is Kashmir important to the Pakistani
OIR economy? How and to what degree?
3. Military: what is the importance of Kashmir in re-
G-2 lation to possible conflict with India? -- in re-
lation to conflict with any other state? Do military
leaders of Pakistan attach importance to Kashmir?
4. What is the relation of the Kashmir issue to Paki-
OIR stani domestic politics?
5. What is the relative weight of these factors? Is
OIR and G-2 there any particular urgency or a time factor
attached to any one or to all?
- C. Could these interests in Kashmir be satisfied for either
OIR nation by anything short of total control of Kashmir?
and G-2 If so, to what extent? How geographically?

III. WHAT ARE INDIA'S CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS?

- A. What are India's military capabilities in relation to:
(1) all-out war against Pakistan; (2) limited action
OIR and Defense designed to secure all or a part of Kashmir without any
invasion of present Pakistan or with only limited in-
vasion. To what extent might India be aided or hindered
by Afghan intervention in a conflict?

B. What are India's political capabilities:

- OIR
1. Through continued cooperation with Abdullah including such projects as the approaching Constituent Assembly elections? What are the likely results of these elections and what consequences would follow from these results?
 2. Through UN action? Would Indian leaders believe there was a possibility of a favorable turn in the UN?
 3. Through collusion with Afghanistan? Could the Indian leaders hope to use this to hamstring the Pakistani and continue the present status quo?

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- C. What intentions are indicated by recent Indian activities?
- Do Indian military moves and political statements indicate a desire to provoke war, a willingness to accept war, or the pursuit of political objectives through military pressure?
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Defense
1. Is there any direct evidence of the purpose of recent Indian activities?
 2. Do Indian military moves constitute a complete preparation for either a limited or all-out war? Would additional moves be necessary or likely before either could be undertaken?
- Defense

Defense
3. Are there any special time or weather factors limiting Indian freedom of action?

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4. What possible non-military object could the recent moves have?

D. From the Indian standpoint, what are the pros and cons of a deliberate resort to war by India?

I. Possible Pros:

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a. Do the Indians believe that they might achieve a fairly easy victory which would cement their position in Kashmir and at the same time secure the border and release their forces?

OIR
b. Do the Indians believe that nothing short of military force will achieve a lasting solution satisfactory to their interests, and that they cannot expect such a solution from political measures?

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c. Would a campaign against Pakistan, limited or all-out, have domestic political advantages for Nehru?

2. Possible Cons:

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a. Do the Indians regard the present status quo in Kashmir as satisfactory without the need for further action?

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b. Are the Indians uncertain of a quick and easy victory? If so, to what extent may they be deterred by possible destruction, cost, and economic burdens of a prolonged struggle?

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c. Are the Indians deterred by any prospect of renewed communal rioting within India as a result of war?

OIR

d. Are the Indians deterred by any prospect of Pakistani reaction elsewhere, such as expulsion of Hindus from Bengal or adverse trade measures?

OIR

e. Are the Indians deterred by possible adverse external reactions: e.g., (a) in the UN; (b) in Asia, (Burma, Indonesia, etc.); (c) in the Moslem world (affecting Iranian oil for example); (d) in the British Commonwealth nations, affecting India's ties in this quarter?

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f. Are the Indians deterred by any prospect that an armed conflict would greatly weaken the overall strength of the area in the face of the Soviet threat?

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3. Do the cons outweigh the pros? Is a deliberate resort to war by India likely?

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E. Might the Indian government be driven to war by popular clamor or by increased communal rioting and feeling within India? What are the prospects of such clamor and increased rioting? Is there any evidence of Communist activity designed to promote them (cf. the Tudeh party in Iran)?

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F. In the absence of full-scale hostilities, what non-military courses of action are the Indians likely to follow? What are the chances of increased cooperation with and promotion of the Abdullah regime? Of increased collusion with Afghanistan? Of any other new courses of action? Finally, what are the chances of Indian acquiescence in UN action?

IV. WHAT ARE PAKISTAN'S CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS?

Defense

A. What are Pakistan's military capabilities in relation to: (1) all-out war against India; (2) limited action designed to secure all or a part of Kashmir without any invasion of present India or with only limited such invasion? To what extent might Pakistan be aided or hindered by Afghan intervention in a conflict?

B. What are Pakistan's political capabilities:

OIR 1. Through the UN? Are the Pakistani leaders
confident of a favorable solution through the UN?

OIR 2. Through enlistment of British Commonwealth or
other support?

C. What are the indications from the Pakistani response

OIR and Defense to India's activities? Do Pakistani military moves
and political statements indicate a desire to provoke
war, a willingness to accept war, or the pursuit of
political objectives through military pressure?

Defense 1. Do Pakistani military moves indicate a state of
complete readiness for war? Do troop dispositions
indicate the possibility of action elsewhere
than in Kashmir itself?
2. Have Pakistani political statements been conciliatory or do they indicate a possible desire to put
OIR India in the wrong and accept war?

D. From the Pakistani standpoint, what are the pros and cons
of a deliberate resort to war by Pakistan?

OIR 1. Possible pros:
a. Do the Pakistani leaders regard the present
Kashmir situation as intolerable and any
favorable UN solution as so remote or impossible
as to be not worth waiting for?

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- b. Do the Pakistani leaders believe that, whatever their prospects in an all-out war, they might be able to achieve initial successes and then dig in and possibly accept a UN cease-fire?
- c. How strong are the domestic political pressures for war?

2. Possible Cons:

- a. Do the Pakistani leaders fear that a war would become one of attrition with heavy casualties and other burdens?
- b. Are the Pakistani leaders deterred by the exposed position of East Pakistan?
- c. Do the Pakistani leaders fear attack from Afghanistan in the event of war with India? (Or, on the contrary, might the Pakistani leaders expect that in the event of war with India the Pathan tribes might join with Pakistan and against Afghanistan, to Pakistan's long-term advantage?)
- d. Are the Pakistani sensitive to the fact that conflict would weaken the area in face of a Soviet threat?

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e. Are the Pakistani leaders deterred by
possible adverse world and British
Commonwealth opinion?

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f. Do the cons outweigh the pros? Is a deliberate
resort to war by Pakistan likely?

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E. Might the Pakistan government be driven to war by
popular clamor, by border incidents, or even by the
Pakistani army itself getting out of control and
taking unauthorized hostile action? What are the
chances of such events? Is there any evidence of
Communist activity designed to promote them?

OIR

F. In the absence of full-scale hostilities, what non-
military courses of action are the Pakistani likely to
follow? What moves might Pakistan make in the UN?
Might Pakistan seek some other solution, such as a
resort to arbitration or the International Court of
Justice?

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V. WHAT UN COURSES OF ACTION ARE LIKELY TO AFFECT THE SITUATION
UP TO THE END OF 1951?

What is the likely effect of the Graham mission? What other

OIR action might the UN take, either at the instigation of one

of the parties or of some third nation? What concrete action might the UN take in implementing any resolution?

VI. WHAT ARE THE PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE ?

How might either India or Pakistan react to possible moves by the other or by the UN? What are the chances OIR and Defense of a series of actions, individually less than a provocation to war, creating a situation in which war would become more likely? How might this happen? Conversely, what are the chances of a relaxation of tension? How might this happen?

VII. WHAT EFFECT COULD THESE PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE ON US SECURITY INTERESTS?

This section is intended to delineate, but not to give a detailed analysis of, the principal consequences of developments in the dispute, particularly actual hostilities, on US security interests. Attention might be given to the possible denial of strategic materials and/or bases to the US, and on a broader scale to the possible effect with regard to such points as (1) the maintenance of orderly government in India and Pakistan; (2) the survival of an independent Pakistan; (3) US-Pakistan and US-India relations; (4) defence of the

Middle East; (5) the position of Afghanistan; (6) Soviet and/or Chinese Communist efforts to exploit any of the above in order to improve their positions in South and Southeast Asia.